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COMMENTS
ADJUDICATING ADEA DISPARATE
TREATMENT CLAIMS WITHIN THE
EVIDENTIARY FRAMEWORK OF
TITLE VII: AN ORDER OF PROOF FOR
AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(Act or ADEA),' to extend equal employment rights to the aged by pro-
tecting older workers from arbitrary employment practices.' The Act is
essentially modeled after title VII of the Civil Rights Act,3 but borrows the
enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).4 It pro-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (for ease in reference individual sec-
tions of the ADEA discussed herein are designated by their section number alone). The
purpose of the ADEA is twofold: to eliminate age discrimination in employment and to
encourage employment of older workers "based on their ability rather than their age." 29
U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
2. As originally enacted, the ADEA extended protection to persons between the ages
of 40 and 65. The upper age limit was raised to 70 in the 1978 amendment to the Act. See
29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V 1981). The upper age limit was justified as being "reasonably
related to the age when individuals generally cease to be able to function effectively in the
work force and retire." B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
393 (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (for ease in reference, the
individual sections of title VII discussed herein are designated by their section number
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
Section 703 of title VII contains the primary substantive prohibitions and provides in
pertinent part:
(a) [I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or . . . to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individuals's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (ADEA's primary
substantive prohibitions), infra note 5; see also Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 455 F.2d
818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972) ("With a few minor exceptions the prohibitions of [the ADEA] are
in terms identical to those of title VII . . . except that 'age' has been substituted for race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.").
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) provides
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hibits hiring, promotion, and discharge decisions based upon age related
factors.5 Despite the ADEA's verbatim adoption of title VII's substantive
prohibitions, the ADEA remains a separate and distinct piece of fair em-
ployment legislation. 6
During the ADEA's first decade of implementation, judicial preoccupa-
tion with procedural issues7 and ineffective agency administration hin-
that the ADEA "shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures
provided in sections 21 1(b), 216[(b)-(e)], and 217," of the [FLSA].
5. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1978) provides in pertinent part:
(a) [l]t shall be unlawful for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee because of such individual's age ....
6. Congress considered including age as a proscribed basis for employment discrimi-
nation in title VII but concluded that further studies on age discrimination needed to be
conducted. Hearings on HR. 405 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Education
and Labor, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 22, 38-39, 92, 430, 478-79 (1963). This compromise ar-
rangement allowed Congress to proceed with title VII's enactment while tabling further leg-
islative action regarding age discrimination until the Secretary of Labor undertook the
studies necessary. See § 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (title VII
provision directing the study of age discrimination in employment).
The ADEA was enacted in response to the Secretary of Labor's report, United States
Department of Labor, The Older American Worker Age Discrimination in Employment, I I 
CONG. REC. 23,037 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1965). Congress had a twofold purpose in enacting the
ADEA as a separate statute rather than as an amendment to title VII: to take advantage of
hindsight by avoiding those statutory provisions under title VII that Congress found unsatis-
factory and to ensure an adequate review of age discrimination complaints by not addition-
ally burdening title VII's administrative agency with ADEA claims. See infra note 133 and
accompanying text.
7. The two major procedural issues that distracted the courts from considering the
merits of an ADEA claim concerned the right to a jury trial and the jurisdictional prerequi-
sites to suit.
After 10 years of circuit court debate the Supreme Court in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575
(1978), concluded that a statutory right to a jury trial for lost wages in a damage suit was
impliedly granted by Congress under the Act. Congress subsequently expanded the
Supreme Court's ruling by expressly recognizing in the 1978 amendments to the ADEA that
a jury trial was available for liquidated damages as well as lost wages even where equitable
relief was also sought. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
The Federal Courts also repeatedly addressed whether the § 626(d) requirement of filing a
notice of intent to sue with the Secretary of Labor constituted a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit. Congress somewhat mooted this procedural issue by amending § 626(d) in 1978 to
replace the notice of intent to sue requirement with the less onerous requirement of filing a
"charge" of potential suit. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (Supp. V 1981). Although the substitution
itself does not expressly resolve the issue, legislative history indicates that the "charge" re-
quirement was not intended as a jurisdictional prerequisite. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1978).
For a more detailed discussion of these procedural issues, see, for example, Bickerton, The
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dered the progress of the Act's remedial purposes.' Currently, the
enforcement of the Act is frustrated by the continuing debate in the federal
circuits over the proper allocation of burdens of proof 9 for ADEA dispa-
rate treatment claims."° The Supreme Court has acknowledged, in the title
VII context, the difficulty a plaintiff would have in sustaining a a tradi-
tional burden of production-particularly proof of discriminatory mo-
ADEA Comes ofAge, 16 TRIAL 22 (Jan. 1980); Nelson & Wilson, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 4 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIAL J. 31 (Dec. 1979).
8. See Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and LegalAspects ofAge Discrimina-
tion in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REV. 829, 876-77 (1974) ("As of 1969, there were less than
1,000 enforcement officers in the Wage and Hour Division [of the Department of Labor]
devoting less than ten percent of their time to age discrimination complaints .... "). As the
author predicted, the administration of the ADEA was transferred from the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) which was already charged with title VII's administration. Reorganization Plan No.
1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978); Exec. Order No. 12, 144, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,193 (1979).
9. "Burden of proof" is an ambiguous term encompassing the burden of pleading, the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion. Typically in a civil suit the party with
the burden of pleading carries two additional burdens at trial-the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion. The initial burden at trial-the burden of production-re-
quires the plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence during his case-in-chief on each element of
his claim or otherwise suffer an adverse directed verdict. In any event, the plaintiff is not
entitled to a favorable verdict unless he successfully carries his ultimate burden-the burden
of persuasion. The plaintiff is required to persuade the trier of fact, usually by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the evidence produced is sufficient for a favorable finding. See
generally, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 336-345 (E. Cleary ed.
1972). In this Comment, as in ADEA and title VII caselaw, the term "burden of proof"
encompasses the trial burdens of production and persuasion.
10. As the Supreme Court noted in one of its title VII decisions, disparate treatment
means:
it]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ...
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress 'dis-
parate impact.' The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group
than another. . . .International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335-36 n.15 (1977).
The disparate treatment-disparate impact dichotomy rests primarily on the distinction in
the medium through which discrimination is being practiced-direct discriminatory conduct
against an individual as opposed to a neutral employment policy that discriminates in its
impact-although a claim of discrimination may be established by use of either theory. See.
e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (title VII race discrimination suit
brought by black job applicants who had been rejected by the defendant in favor of white
applicants because of a "by recommendation only" hiring scheme that resulted in an ap-
proved employment list solely comprised of white laborers).
The disparate treatment-disparate impact dichotomy was developed initially by courts
adjudicating title VII claims and in light of the statutory similarity, has been generally rec-
ognized in the ADEA context. See, e.g., Allison v. Western Union, 680 F.2d 1318 (1 Ith Cir.
1982).
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tive "-in a disparate treatment case. 2 To remedy this inequity and to
facilitate the enforcement of title VII, the Court, in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green," reordered the burdens of proof typical in a civil case.
The Court held that discriminatory intent is presumed when the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case' 4 of discrimination that satisfies the criteria
specified in McDonnell Douglas. 5 The defendant must then come forward
with some evidence to rebut the presumption. The plaintiff, however, can
subsequently challenge the defendant's evidence on the basis that the justi-
fication given is merely a pretext.' 6
In adjudicating ADEA disparate treatment claims, the federal courts
have failed to reach a consensus as to whether the McDonnell Douglas
allocation should apply to age discrimination claims. A majority of the
courts of appeals have agreed that a presumption of discriminatory motive
is equally warranted in ADEA cases. t7 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, in rejecting the majority's extension, maintains
that McDonnell Douglas is limited by its facts and by considerations pecu-
liar to title VII. 8 Even under the prevailing view favoring adoption of
title VII's order of proof, however, the courts of appeals disagree on how
strictly they should borrow the McDonnell Douglas elements of a prima
facie case in determining whether the plaintiff has raised an inference of
discriminatory intent in ADEA cases.' 9
1I. A further distinction between the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories
is that proof of discriminatory intent, while essential in a disparate treatment case, "is not
required under a disparate-impact theory." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
12. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
13. Id
14. In this comment, as in title VII and ADEA caselaw, the term "prima facie case"
denotes the creation of a rebuttable presumption upon a particular set of factual elements.
The presumption created conditionally relieves the burden of producing further proof on an
essential element of the claim. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981) (title VII suit in which court similarly defines its use of the term
"prima facie case"). For a more thorough discussion on the operation of a prima facie case,
see MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at §§ 342-345.
15. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Daye v. Harris, 655 F.2d 258, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Douglas v. Anderson,
656 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066 n.3 (4th Cir. 1980);
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1010 (1st Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1978); Hughes v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 585 F.2d
918, 919 n.1 (8th Cir. 1978); Kentroti v. Frontier Airlines, 585 F.2d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1978);
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239-40 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
18. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312-13 (6th Cir. 1975). See also infra
notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1981); Kentroti v. Frontier
Airlines, 585 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1978); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977).
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This Comment first explains the holding of McDonnell Douglas and the
conflict over the extension of McDonnell Douglas' framework to ADEA
disparate treatment claims. It then examines the debate in the federal cir-
cuits that have adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework over the proper
elements of a prima facie case in ADEA cases. The Comment justifies the
adoption of the title VII framework for ADEA disparate treatment cases in
light of policy considerations and statutory construction and concludes
that the prima facie case elements specified in McDonnell Douglas are gen-
erally sufficient to raise an analogous inference of age discrimination.
I. ORDER OF PROOF IN TITLE VII DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
While the ADEA suffered procedural setbacks, its parent statute-title
VII-was advanced judicially with the Supreme Court's decision in Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 20 Noting the lack of harmony among the
three court of appeals judges,2 the Court set forth the proper order of
proof in title VII disparate treatment cases.
.4. The McDonnell Douglas Evidentiary Framework
Percy Green, a black male, brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against McDonnell Douglas
Corporation alleging discrimination in violation of title VII and section
198122 of the Civil Rights Act.23 The plaintiff had been employed by Mc-
Donnell Douglas from 1956 until 1964 when he was laid off due to a gen-
eral reduction in force. During his employment Mr. Green had
participated in civil rights protests directed at his employer. After his lay-
off he continued to organize and participate in demonstrations that chal-
lenged McDonnell Douglas' employment practices as racially
discriminatory. Two of the demonstrations involved the obstruction of
traffic on the access road to the defendant's plant2 4 and the padlocking of a
20. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
21. Id
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
23. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mo. 1970), rev'd in
part, 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
24. The plaintiff, in protest of his layoff, organized and lead a "stall-in" during the
month of October of 1964, blocking access to the defendant's plant at the time of a shift
change. The plaintiff was arrested, plead guilty and paid a fifty dollar fine. Id. at 848-49.
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company office building during business hours.2 5
Shortly after these protests, Mr. Green applied for a mechanic's position
that was advertised by the defendant. McDonnell Douglas rejected his
application, stating that although Mr. Green was qualified for the job, his
participation in the illegal "stall-in" and "lock-in" disqualified him from
consideration for reemployment. The plaintiff maintained that these civil
rights activities were protected under section 704,26 which prohibits an em-
ployer from retaliating against employees and applicants who challenge
the employer's unlawful practices.27
The district court stated that Green's statutory claims were premised on
the defendant's refusal to rehire in violation of section 704 and discrimina-
tory layoff in violation of section 1981.28 The section 1981 claim was held
barred by the statute of limitations 29 and the section 704 claim was ulti-
mately dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to sustain his burden of
proof.30 The court, having already ruled that the "stall-in" and "lock-in"
were not protected activity,3 reasoned that Mr. Green failed to demon-
strate that other reasons, such as racial prejudice or retaliation for legiti-
25. On July 2, 1965 the plaintiffs civil rights protest organization picketed against Mc-
Donnell Douglas' layoffs at the defendant's plant. During the course of this demonstration,
some of the defendant's employees were locked in their offices by members of the plaintiff's
organization. The district court ruled that the plaintiff was vicariously responsible for the
"lock-in." Id. at 848-49. On remand from the Supreme Court it was established that Green
himself may have padlocked the doors. Green, 528 F.2d 1102, 1106 n.7 (8th Cir. 1976).
26. Title VII § 704 provides in pertinent part:
(a) [Ilt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrimi-
nate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or
because he has made a change, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
27. There is some debate as to the extent of activities protected under title VII § 704(a).
The Eighth Circuit, agreeing with the lower court, held that in any event it does not protect
unlawful activities. Green, 463 F.2d 337, 341 (8th Cir. 1972).
28. The pleadings were unclear as to whether the plaintiff was proceeding against Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corporation for discriminatory layoff under § 1981 or title VII and
whether the plaintiffs title VII rehiring claim was solely premised on § 704 (retaliatory re-
jection) or sufficiently included a § 703 racial discrimination charge. The district court con-
cluded that the plaintiff alleged discriminatory layoff only under § 1981. Green, 318 F.
Supp. at 849. The title VII § 703 discriminatory rehiring claim was dismissed upon the
defendant's motion to strike because the EEOC had not made a "reasonable cause finding."
Green, 299 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mo. 1969). See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
29. The state statute of limitations for analogous suits was borrowed because there is no
express statute of limitations under § 1981. Green, 318 F. Supp. at 849.
30. Id. at 830.
31. The court characterized these activities as unlawful acts unprotected by the first
amendment or § 704. Id at 851.
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mate civil rights activities, were the real motives behind the refusal to
rehire. 32 Green appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eight Circuit. 33
In his appeal, Green alleged that the district court erred in: (1) dis-
missing his section 1981 claim as barred by the statute of limitations; (2)
holding that his protest demonstrations were not protected by section 704;
and (3) striking his section 703 claim for failure to comply with the juris-
dictional prerequisite of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) "reasonable cause" finding.34 All three judges agreed that the
section 1981 claim alleging discriminatory layoff was properly dismissed
because it was not pleaded within the five year statute of limitations.35
The panel also essentially agreed that unlawful conduct is not legitimate
civil rights activity protected within the meaning of section 704.36 The
judges, however, rendered three divergent opinions with regard to the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the section 703 claim.3
Judge Bright, writing for the majority, reversed the trial court, holding
that under the prevailing view, "an EEOC reasonable cause finding is not
a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit" under title VII.38 Judge Lay con-
curred 39 and Justice Johnsen, in his dissenting opinion, conceded that the
trial court erred, but contended that the plaintiff suffered no prejudice be-
cause the issue was nonetheless tried by consent.4
The Eighth Circuit split over the characterization of this error. The ma-
jority and concurring opinions contended that the district court committed
reversible error in striking the plaintiffs section 703 disparate treatment
claim. As Judge Bright stated, "[wie cannot say that the district court's
action .. . did not hamper the preparation and presentation of [Mr.]
32. Id. at 851.
33. Green, 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972).
34. Id. at 340. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
35. Green, 463 F.2d at 340-41, 346 (Johnsen, J., dissenting).
36. Judge Bright and Judge Lay disagreed with the dissent and the district court that
there was conclusive evidence to hold Mr. Green responsible for the "lock-in," but all three
judges agreed that the plaintiff was involved in the "stall-in." Id. at 341, 345 (Lay, J., con-
curring), 347-48 (Johnsen, J., dissenting).
37. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
38. Green, 463 F.2d at 342 ("[tlhe enforcement provisions of title VII are silent as to the
necessity of such a finding ....").
39. Id. at 344 ("The Court's order refusing plaintiff leave to amend his complaint and
utilize discovery on the issue of racial discrimination because the E.E.O.C. had not based its
findings of probable cause on this ground is conceded error.").
40. Id at 346, 351 ("the failure of the Commission to make a finding of reasonable
cause on some particular charge does not preclude that charge from being asserted . . . .
am not able, however . . . to agree . . .[it] entitles him to a reversal .... ").
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Green's case ... ."' Both Judge Bright and Judge Lay concluded that
even though Mr. Green failed to make a case of retaliation under section
704, he could still proceed with a section 703 allegation of racial discrimi-
nation. Mr. Green was entitled, therefore, to have the trial court deter-
mine whether the "stall-in" or "lock-in" was activity that would
sufficiently justify a refusal to rehire under section 703 of title VII.42 The
majority explained that this justification was required because racial dis-
crimination "is often cloaked in generalities or vague criteria which do not
measure an applicant's qualifications in terms of job requirements. 43
The court ultimately remanded the section 703 claim to be tried in ac-
cordance with the following standards:'
When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifi-
cations to fill a job opening and that he was denied the job which
continues to remain open, .... he presents a prima facie case of
racial discrimination.
Of the several civil rights protests which Green directed against
McDonnell, the employer selected two, the "lock-in" and the
"stall-in," as reasons for its refusal to rehire Green. Green
should be given the opportunity to show that these reasons of-
fered by the Company were pretextual, or otherwise show the
presence of racially discriminatory hiring practices by McDon-
nell which affected its decision.45
41. Id. at 342.
42. As Judge Bright maintained, §§ 703 & 704 "apply to wholly different facets of the
employment relationship." Id at 343. Section 704 focuses on whether the employer's retali-
atory rejection was due to the plaintifis protected protest activity while § 703's focal concern
is whether the employer's reasons for rejection "were related to the requirements of job."
Id. at 342, 345-46. See infra notes 43, 48-49 and accompanying text.
43. Id at 343. The majority borrowed for disparate treatment analysis the same burden
imposed on the employer in the disparate impact case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs required the employer to show a business necessity for the employ-
ment testing device by establishing its relationship to job performance in order to sustain the
discriminatory practice under title VII. Griggs at 431. The burden imposed, however, is a*
statutory requirement peculiar to a disparate impact case. Section 703 provides:
nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act
upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test,
its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
44. Upon McDonnell Douglas' petition for rehearing, the majority revised its opinion
regarding the standards for retrial by substituting modified language. Id. at 352. The dis-
sent filed a supplemental opinion comparing the substituted language and stated that "I am
not certain as to the intended effect of these changes, and I suspect that the district court also
will have difficulty in trying to assess the significance of the substituted language." Id. at
354.
45. Id. at 353 (revised majority opinion).
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Judge Johnsen dissented as to the reversal and remand of the secton 703
claim. He maintained that the trial court's error was not prejudicial be-
cause "the district court did not adhere to its initial pleading ruling."46
Rather, it received evidence on the section 703 disparate treatment claim
and concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish racial prejudice.47
The majority was also criticized for holding that a rejection alone of a
qualified job candidate was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination merely when the applicant is black. Judge Johnsen
charged that this does not sufficiently establish that "racial motivation was
in fact involved," which is an essential element in a disparate treatment
claim. 8 The dissent also took issue with the majority's standard that the
employer demonstrate in "some objective way" that the applicant's dis-
qualifying conduct was "related to the requirements of the job."4 9 Judge
Johnsen argued that the majority improperly borrowed the requirement of
"business necessity" from the disparate impact case of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. 50
McDonnell Douglas appealed to the United States Supreme Court.5 '
The Court unanimously affirmed the Eighth Circuit's reversal regarding
the section 703 issue,52 but ordered retrial upon a different allocation of
burdens. The Court also implicitly acknowledged the competing concerns
of premature exposure to employer liability under title VII and burden of
proof problems regarding discriminatory intent. Writing for the Court,
Justice Powell struck a balance in the allocation of evidentiary burdens by
creating a three step framework, under which the title VII plaintiff is to
carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment. The plaintiff may sustain this burden by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
46. Id. at 351 (Johnsen, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. Judge Johnsen argued that the district court's ultimate findings regarding the
defendant's refusal to rehire were dispositive of the § 703 claim as well as the § 704 claim.
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
48. Id at 349-50.
49. Id. at 354-55 (supplemental dissenting opinion).
50. Id. at 350. See supra note 43.
51. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
52. The Court agreed that the "absence of a commission finding of reasonable cause
cannot bar suit . I..." Id at 798. In concluding that the error was prejudicial, the Court
rejected Judge Johnsen's consent argument, see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text,
finding instead that "Itihe trial court did not discuss [the plaintiffs] § 703(a)(1) claim in its
opinion and denied requests for discovery of statistical material which may have been rele-
vant to that claim." Id. at 800 n.10.
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(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications.5 3
The burden then is shifted "to the employer to articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection," but such
justification need not amount to a "business necessity."54 If the justifica-
tion offered rebuts the prima facie case, the trial court's inquiry is to con-
tinue, with the plaintiff being afforded an opportunity to demonstrate that
the stated reasons for rejection are pretextual.55
B. The McDonnell Douglas Progeny
In the ten years following the McDonnell Douglas decision the lower
federal courts were minimally successful in uniformly implementing the
disparate treatment framework. The Supreme Court was forced to inter-
vene on several occasions in order to clarify the principles enunciated in
McDonnell Douglas. The refinements were necessary because the McDon-
nell Douglas Court, in allocating this burden of proof, failed to state a
rationale for departing from the typical allocation in a civil case.
The Supreme Court's first attempt to clarify the McDonnell Douglas
framework was made in Teamsters v. United States.56 The defendants,
employer and labor union,57 contended that the government, in a class
action suit, must conform its proof to the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case by introducing specific evidence of disparate treatment as to each
53. Id. at 802. The Court adopted Judge Bright's specifications of the prima facie case,
rejecting Judge Johnsen's objection that the element of intent is lacking, and cautioned that
"prima facie proof required ...is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
54. Id at 802-03. The Court, by agreeing with Judge Johnsen that the burden placed
on the employer by the majority is not compelled by title VII, noted that the Griggs burden
of proving "business necessity" is required only "[w]here employers have instituted employ-
ment tests and qualifications with an exclusionary effect on minority applicants." Id at 802
n.14, 806-07.
55. Id at 804. The Court suggested that a pretext may be established by showing the
justification given does not adequately explain the differential treatment. Id at 804 (for
example, "white employees involved in acts ... of comparable seriousness to the "stall-in"
were nevertheless retained or rehired"). For a more extensive discussion of the ways in
which the plaintiff may demonstrate a pretext, see Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory
Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1154 n. 128 (1980).
56. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The United States Attorney General brought a class action
disparate treatment suit alleging that the defendants' seniority system was racially discrimi-
natory. Although the EEOC substituted the United States as plaintiff, the United States was
retained as a party for jurisdiction purposes, when 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) was amended to
transfer litigating authority from the Attorney General's office to the EEOC. Id. at 325 n.l.
57. The mandates of title VII apply to labor unions as well as employers and employ-
ment agencies. See § 703(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-703(c) (1976).
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class member in order to estabish liability.58 Justice Stewart, writing for
the Court, stated that
[tihe importance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its specifica-
tion of the discrete elements of proof there required, but in its
recognition of the general principle that any [t]itle VII plaintiff
must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to
create an inference that an employment decision was based upon
a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.5 9
In a footnote discussion immediately following, the Court explained that
McDonnell Douglas eliminated the need for direct proof of discriminatory
intent by condoning the use of a prima facie case under which an inference
of discrimination can be sufficiently created.6" The Court concluded that,
when dealing with a disparate treatment claim in the context of a class
action, proof of a discriminatory hiring pattern and practice was sufficient
at the liability stage of trial6' to make out a "prima facie case of discrimi-
nation against the individual class members . *"62
Justice Stewart also attempted to supply the reasoning, absent from the
McDonnell Douglas decision, for invoking a presumption of discrimina-
tion and intent. He justified McDonnell Douglas's use of a prima facie case
as consistent with the common law, noting that historically
"[p]resumptions shifting the burden of proof are often created to reflect
judicial evaluations of probabilities and to conform with a party's superior
access to proof."6 3 Justice Stewart concluded that a McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case was warranted in disparate treatment cases because it es-
tablished the probability that intentional discrimination had occurred and
because "the employer [is] in the best position to show why any individual
58. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 357. The government sought retroactive seniority for the
entire class, including minority employees and applicants, by establishing disparate treat-
ment as to 40 of the class members. Id
59. Id. at 358.
60. Id at 358 n.44. The McDonnell Douglas specification was sufficient to creaie the
necessary inference in that case because it eliminated "the two most common [nondiscrimi-
natory] reasons. . . to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or
the absence of a vacancy in the job sought." Id.
61. The Court distinguished for purposes of proof the liability stage of trial from the
remedial stage in a class action disparate treatment suit. At the liability stage, the plaintiff
need not produce evidence that each class member was in fact disparately treated. It is
sufficient to show that the defendant had a regular procedure or policy of discriminating
against the class group. When time for individual relief comes, only those class members
that the government has shown were applicants for a job or promotion are entitled to relief.
id. at 360-62.
62. Id. at 359.
63. Id. at 359 n.45 (citations omitted).
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employee was denied an employment opportunity." 6
Less than one year after Teamsters, the Supreme Court was again faced
with an appeal regarding the McDonnell Douglas framework. In Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters,65 the Court addressed the legal significance
of the prima facie case. Reprimanding the court of appeals for "equating a
prima facie [case] under McDonnell Douglas with an ultimate finding of
fact as to discriminat[ion], ' 66 Justice Rehnquist cautioned that the prima
facie case merely raises a rebuttable presumption of disparate treatment.67
The Court explained that the distinction significantly affected the extent
of the defendant's burden under McDonnell Douglas. The Seventh Circuit
had required the employer to prove after the plaintiffs prima facie case
that the contested hiring practice was the least onerous way in which he
could pursue his legitimate business objectives or otherwise he would be
forced to adopt a court devised hiring scheme .6' The Supreme Court
unanimously 69 held that, in light of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case and the rebuttable nature of the presumption, the employer need only
establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action
taken.70 To require more, the Court reasoned, would be premature since a
conclusive finding of discrimination is not made until the end of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas paradigm.7'
The issue creating the most controversy in the lower courts 72-the evi-
dentiary nature of the defendant's burden of proof73 under McDonnell
Douglas-was conclusively resolved in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine. 7 Justice Powell explained that McDonnell Douglas' use
64. Id.
65. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). See supra note 10.
66. Id. at 576.
67. Id. at 579-80.
68. Id. at 574.
69. Although Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Brennan,
they concurred as to the majority's holding regarding the disparate treatment theory. Id at
581-83 (Marshall, I., dissenting). They dissented from the majority's foreclosure of the dis-
parate impact claim. Id at 583.
70. Id at 577.
71. Id at 578.
72. For a more extensive discussion of the split among the lower courts concerning the
nature of the defendant's burden under McDonnell Douglas, see Mendez, supra note 55 at
1135-39.
73. See supra note 9.
74. 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (title VII sex disparate treatment in employment promotion
suit). The Court had attempted to resolve this issue in Board of Trustees of Keene State
College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam), by summarily stating that McDonnell




of the term "prima facie case" denoted "the establishment of a legally
mandatory, rebuttable presumption."7 Reasoning further that "the word
'presumption' properly used refers only to a device for allocating the pro-
duction burden,"76 Justice Powell concluded that only a burden of pro-
duction shifted to the defendant under the McDonnell Douglas
allocation. 7 The burden of persuasion "remains at all times with the
plaintiff."78
II. ORDER OF PROOF IN ADEA DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
Like section 703 of title VII, section 623 of the ADEA prohibits dispa-
rate treatment in employment.79 This statutory similarity triggered the de-
bate among the federal circuits over whether title VII's allocation of
burdens is controlling by analogy in age discrimination claims and, if so,
to what extent should the McDonnell Douglas elements of a prima facie
case be borrowed.
4. ADEA "s Allocation of Burdens
Before the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Hodg-
son v. First Federal Savings and Loan ,o addressed the issue of the proper
allocation of evidentiary burdens in an ADEA disparate treatment case.
Secretary of Labor James Hodgson brought suit8 on behalf of Mrs. Betty
Hall and alleged that her employment rejection was in violation of section
62382 of the ADEA.8 3 The trial court denied relief citing failure of proof.
84
75. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7. See supra note 14.
76. 450 U.S. at 255 n.8 (citations omitted).
77. Id at 254.
78. Id at 253.
79. Compare supra note 3 with supra note 5.
80. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
81. The Secretary of Labor was empowered under 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1969) to bring suit
to enforce the right of any person aggrieved under the Act. Since 1978 the enforcement
authority has been transferred to the EEOC. See supra note 8.
82. See supra note 5.
83. Mrs. Hall, then 47 years of age, had sought employment at the defendant's banking
institute but was rejected on the pretense that her overweight condition made her physically
incapable of the long hours of standing required for the job. The Secretary of Labor
brought suit seeking a back pay award for Mrs. Hall and an injunction against further viola-
tions towards similarly situated persons since there was also evidence that the defendant had
listed the position at an employment agency requesting applicants between the ages of 21
and 24. Hodgson, 455 F.2d at 819-20.
84. The district court granted the injunction sought but denied the backpay award for
Mrs. Hall, finding that the Secretary of Labor failed to produce proof of intentional discrim-
ination. Id at 821-22.
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The Secretary appealed, claiming that the district court relied upon errone-
ous standards of proof.85
Although this was the first ADEA disparate treatment case to reach the
circuit level, the Fifth Circuit nonetheless felt that the "law with respect to
[the] burden of proof [was] well settled."86 Relying upon its title VII pre-
cedent of Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. ,87 the court
unanimously reversed and held that "[tihe plaintiff is required only to
make out a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination at which point the
burden shifts to the defendant to justify the existence of any disparities.9 88
The Fifth Circuit's reliance on the Weeks allocation of evidentiary bur-
dens, though, superficially appears to be misplaced because Weeks in-
volved the affirmative defense of a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ).89 Traditionally, the burden of proving an affirmative defense
rests on the pleader.90 Hodgson, however, did not rely singularly on
Weeks. Rather, the court also reasoned that the shift in the burden of
proof was justified in disparate treatment cases because the defendant is in
the best "position to know whether he failed to hire a person for reasons
which would exonerate him."'"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co. ,92 declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's lead. In the interim
85. The Secretary of Labor also contended that the district court erred in limiting the
injunction to the hiring of tellers since evidence that the defendant discriminated on account
of age in its advertisement for other banking personnel was introduced at trial. Id.
86. Id
87. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). Weeks involved a title VII § 703 complaint alleging
sex discrimination. The defendant argued that state protective legislation preventing women
and minors from occupying employment positions that required the lifting of more than 30
pounds constituted a valid defense of a bona fide occupation qualification (BFOQ) under
§ 703(e)(1). Id at 232-33. Although the court was more immediately concerned with the
standards for a BFOQ defense, it summarily dealt with the allocation of burdens in a dispa-
rate treatment case by stating that since the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of
discrimination the defendant had the burden of proving a defense. Id at 231-32.
88. Hodgson, 455 F.2d at 822.
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. The Weeks decision pointed to legisla-
tive history and an EEOC regulation characterizing the BFOQ exception as an affirmative
defense. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 232.
90. See MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at § 338.
91. Hodgson, 455 F.2d at 822.
92. 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975). The plaintiff at age 56 was permanently laid off by the
defendant due to a general reduction in force (RIF). At trial, he introduced evidence that
his work performance was satisfactory overall and that his position, after the company's
reorganization, was filled by an employee 39 years of age. He also introduced statistical
evidence demonstrating that the post-RIF average age of the defendant's employees was
reduced from 43 to 37 years of age. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was entitled to a
directed verdict or, in the alternative, a jury instruction stating that, under McDonnell Doug-
las, he had sufficiently established a prima facie case. Id. at 310-11.
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following Hodgson the Supreme Court enunciated the McDonnell Douglas
framework which was essentially an elaborate version of the Fifth Circuit's
disparate treatment analysis.9 3 The Laugesen court, nevertheless, stated
that "[wihile it may not be unreasonable to assume that in the proper case,
the guidelines established by McDonnell Douglas v. Green can be applied
in age discrimination cases, we believe it would be inappropriate to simply
borrow and apply them automatically."94
Laugesen involved a section 623 ADEA discriminatory discharge claim
in which judgment was rendered in favor of the employer. The plaintiff
appealed on the grounds that the jury instructions were defective. One
ground of inadequacy cited by the plaintiff was the failure to instruct the
jury that the burden of proof, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas'
standards, shifted to the defendant.9" The Sixth Circuit eventually re-
manded on another ground of error,9 6 but intimated three reasons why the
McDonnell Douglas allocation was inappropriate.
The court's major objection was that McDonnell Douglas did not ad-
dress the "problems and procedures inherent in the submission of issues to
the jury."9 7 Judge Engel, writing for the Sixth Circuit Panel, was appar-
ently concerned with the potential "problem" of jury confusion and the
difficult "procedures" of jury instruction. He argued that the McDonnell
Douglas framework was designed specifically for nonjury proceedings,9"
and questioned whether title VII's evidentiary allocation could be adapted
to ADEA cases where the right to a jury trial is generally recognized.99
Implicit in this argument are the assumptions that the McDonnell Douglas
standards would be recited verbatum to the jury and that the jury, rather
than the judge, would monitor the shifting of burdens.
The Sixth Circuit also rejected the McDonnell Douglas framework as
being too formalistic for ADEA claims. Characterizing McDonnell Doug-
las as a strict approach to employment discrimination due to the "auto-
93. See and compare notes 53-55, 88 and accompanying text. The important similarity
is that a burden of proof shifts to the defendant upon a prima facie showing of discrimina-
tion by the plaintiff.
94. Laugesen, 510 F.2d at 312.
95. Id.
96. The court remanded "because the jury instructions taken as a whole failed to make
it clear that even if more than one factor affected the decision to discharge, [the plaintiff]
could nevertheless recover if one factor was his age ..... ".Id. at 310.
97. Id at 312.
98. By noting that title VII does not afford the right to a jury trial, Judge Engel con-
cluded that McDonnell Douglas was tailored for bench proceedings. Id. at 312 n.2.
99. Id. At the time of the Laugesen decision a minority of federal circuits had con-
cluded that the ADEA did not afford the right to a jury trial. Since then the Supreme Court
and Congress have recognized the right. See supra note 7.
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matic presumption" invoked upon a prespecified prima facie case, Judge
Engel concluded that similar analysis in age discrimination cases was con-
trary to congressional intent."0 He argued that legislative history directed
a case-by-case analysis of ADEA claims,' and noted that the separate
enactment of the ADEA apart from title VII' °2 indicated that dissimilar
judicial treatment was intended. A less formalistic approach was war-
ranted under the ADEA, Judge Engel contended, because the progression
and subsequent replacement of older workers by younger ones is usually a
reflection of the natural process of aging and not discrimination.' 0 3 Ac-
cording to the court, adopting the McDonnell Douglas framework in
ADEA cases would fail to account for the distinction between age and the
classifications under title VII.
The court was also concerned with the factual distinction between Mc-
Donnell Douglas, a discriminatory hiring suit, and Laugesen, a discrimina-
tory discharge suit.'" Although recognizing that McDonnell Douglas'
prima facie case was not a strict formulation, the Sixth Circuit still found
that the factual differences were a significant justification for declining to
follow McDonnell Douglas. °5 The distinction is more properly a concern
with the modifications necessary to adopt McDonnell Douglas' prima facie
case to differing factual situations.
100. Id. at 312-13 n.4.
101. Id
102. Id. at 312.
103. Id. at 312-13 n.4.
104. Id at 312 n.3.
105. Id at 312. The significance of the court's distinction is not apparent because, the
Sixth Circuit, recognizing that the Supreme Court expressly authorized the modification of
the prima facie proof, has conceded that McDonnell Douglas' shift in burdens could be ex-
tended to other factual situations. The court possibly made the distinction in order to hold
that the plaintiff in Laugesen could not use the McDonnell Douglas' prima facie case to
establish an inference of discrimination. This also would explain the Sixth Circuit's distinc-
tion between age and race. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. This explana-
tion, however, fails for two reasons: the plaintiff did not attempt to rely strictly on
McDonnell Douglas' specification of proof to establish a prima facie case, see supra note 93,
and the court made these objections not only to McDonnell Douglas' specification of prima
facie proof but also to its guidelines. Laugesen, 510 F.2d at 312 ("While it may not be
unreasonable to assume that . . . the guidelines established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green
can be applied in age discrimination jury cases, we believe it would be inappropriate
.... .). It is more likely that the Laugesen court in finding McDonnell Douglas inappropri-
ate for ADEA cases was refusing to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant, which
prior to Burdine, see supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text, had been the general inter-
pretation of McDonnell Douglas' allocation. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231,




B. ADEA "s Prima Facie Case
The federal circuits have unanimously rejected the Sixth Circuit's con-
clusion in Laugesen, choosing instead to follow the Fifth Circuit by apply-
ing the McDonnell Douglas framework in ADEA cases."° They dismiss
the Sixth Circuit's hesitancy as being more appropriately directed at the
rigid application of McDonnell Douglas' specification of a prima facie
proof rather than at the adoption of title VII's disparate treatment frame-
work. 10 7 A consensus, however, does not exist regarding the degree of
modification necessary to translate the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case in the ADEA context.
The major area of contention is with the Laugesen fact situation-
ADEA discriminatory discharge suits-because of its immediate factual
dissimilarity with McDonnell Douglas. The Fifth Circuit, one of the more
vocal authorities involved in this debate, set forth in Wilson v. Sealtest
Foods' 8 the analogous McDonnell Douglas prima facie case for an ADEA
discharge suit. In that case, the plaintiff, a sixty-two year old accounting
clerk, had been forced by his employer to take early retirement and was
replaced by a fifty year old employee. The district court granted the de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict finding insufficient evidence of age
discrimination. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff raised
an inference of discrimination by showing that he "was within the pro-
tected class, was asked to take early retirement against his will, was doing
apparently satisfactory work, and was replaced by a younger person."' 0 9
Three years later, the Fifth Circuit again addressed the minimal show-
ing required of the plaintiff in an ADEA case. In Marshall v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. ,t o the court responded to the Laugesen court's con-
cern"'. by concluding that a stronger prima facie case is required in the
ADEA context to shift the burden
[blecause the aging process causes employees constantly to exit
106. See supra note 17 for a listing of the relevant cases.
107. See, e.g., Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066 n.3 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[W]e perceive no
difficulty in utilizing [McDonnell Douglas] for the purposes of guidance in this age discrimi-
nation case,").
108. 501 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1974).
109. Id at 86.
110. 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977). The Secretary of Labor brought suit on behalf of
William Reed for violation of § 623(a)(1), seeking individual relief as well as a nationwide
injunction against further violations. The defendant had fired Mr. Reed, a 57 year old sales-
man, and advertised for sales applicants between the ages of 19-26. The Court of Appeals
held that the injunction requested and granted by the district court was too broad for only a
single violation, but upheld the grant of specific relief to Mr. Reed. Id. at 735.
11l. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
19831
Catholic University Law Review
the labor market while younger ones enter, simply the replace-
ment of an older employee by a younger worker does not raise
the same inference of improper motive that attends replacement
of a black by a white person in a Title VII case."12
The Fifth Circuit then upheld the district court's finding that the plaintiff
sustained his burden by showing that he was discharged within ADEA's
protected class, that the employer sought a younger replacement, and that
a younger person outside the protected class did replace the plaintiff.' "'
Considerable confusion attended the Goodyear decision because the
Fifth Circuit appeared to sanction the defendant's conception of a prima
facie case as well as the district court's finding, both of which vary consid-
erably with the last two factors in Wilson."'t The defendant, Goodyear
Tire, argued that "proof of (1) the employee's membership in the protected
group; (2) his discharge; (3) his replacement with a person outside the pro-
tected group; and (4) his ability to do the job" is essential to constitute an
ADEA prima facie case." 5
Although the Fifth Circuit did concede that Goodyear's elements paral-
lel McDonnell Douglas, it is arguable that the court in Goodyear was dem-
onstrating that "McDonnell Douglas does not establish an immutable
definition of a prima facie case""' 6 and the district court's finding was the
minimal showing required. This explanation of Goodyear, however, was
not sustained by subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions. Within a year and a
half of the Goodyear decision, the Fifth Circuit set forth two inconsistent
standards for a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
In Price v. Maryland Casualty Co. ," the Fifth Circuit recognized the
inconsistency in its earlier decisions. The court, attempting to clarify the
Goodyear decision, held that the plaintiff must show not only that he was a
protected class member and had been discharged from employment, but
also that he had the job qualifications and was replaced by a nonprotected
class member." 8 The Price decision adopted almost verbatim the defend-
112. Goodyear, 554 F.2d at 736.
113. Id at 735-36.
114. Compare supra note 109 and notes 113-15 and accompanying text. All three ver-
sions of an ADEA prima facie case agree as to the first two elements but disagree with
respect to the third and fourth factors. Wilson said satisfactory work performance and re-
placement by a younger person but not necessarily one outside the protected class was suffi-
cient to complete the inference of discrimination. Wilson, 501 F.2d at 86. The defendant in
Goodyear insisted that replacement by a nonprotected class member was necessary but proof
of satisfactory work performance was unessential. See Goodyear, 554 F.2d at 735-36.
115. Goodyear, 554 F.2d at 735.
116. Id
117. 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977).
118. Id at 612.
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ant's position in Goodyear as the minimum standard. The district court's
judgment for the employer in Price was affirmed because the employee's
position was eliminated, and therefore, no replacement was needed." 9
In Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 120 the Fifth Circuit retreated
from its position in Price and held that Wilson and Goodyear required the
plaintiff to show that "he was within the statutorily protected age group,
that he was discharged, that the employer sought to replace him with a
younger person and that he was replaced with a younger person outside
the protected age group."'' The Fifth Circuit now adopted the district
court's finding in Goodyear and eliminated the need for proof of satisfac-
tory work performance. The Westinghouse decision, however, was not in
line with the Wilson standards that had only required replacement of the
employee, but not necessarily replacement by a nonprotected class
member. ' 22
The various and inconsistent formulations of prima facie proof by the
Fifth Circuit are also indicative of the lack of uniformity among the fed-
eral courts in adopting the McDonnell Douglas framework in ADEA
cases. 123 In specifying the minimal proof necessary to raise an analogous
McDonnell Douglas inference of discriminatory intent, the courts have at-
tempted to effect the ADEA's remedial purposes 124 while keeping in per-
119. Id. at 612-13. The court held, in the alternative, that even if the plaintiff was re-
placed, he was not replaced by a nonprotected class member. The court also held that the
defendant sufficiently rebutted a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.
120. 576 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1978).
121. Id at 590.
122. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. In Wilson, the 62 year-old plaintiff had
been replaced by a 50 year-old worker which the court held did not preclude an inference of
discrimination. Wilson, 501 F.2d at 86.
123. See, e.g., Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 1981) (proof
of qualifications and replacement by nonprotected class member essential to establish a
prima facie case); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (1st Cir. 1979) (proof of re-
placement not required by nonprotected class member or even a younger person; only need
to demonstrate that the employer sought a replacement with similar qualifications); Bonham
v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978)
(proof of replacement by a younger person not always required); Moses v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 550 F.2d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 1977) (replacement by younger person, but not neces-
sarily a nonprotected class member, essential to establish a prima facie case).
There is also disagreement among the federal courts over the prima facie proof necessary
to ADEA disparate hiring and promotion cases. See, e.g., Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892,
895 (3d Cir. 1980) (ADEA disparate promotion suit where court required proof that a
younger employee was instead promoted); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 29 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 71, 75 (May 5, 1982) (ADEA disparate hiring suit where court
required proof that a nonprotected class member was instead retained); Bell v. Bolgar, 29
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 116, 118 (Mar. 4, 1982) (ADEA disparate promotion suit
where court required proof that a nonprotected class member was instead promoted).
124. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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spective the nondiscriminatory character that ordinarily attends the
progression and replacement of older workers. 25 The compromises made
in balancing these competing goals have not been uniform. 1
26
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
FRAMEWORK IN ADEA DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
The dispute over whether and to what extent the McDonnell Douglas
framework should govern the evidentiary burdens in ADEA disparate
treatment cases has preoccupied the federal courts for almost a decade. By
dispelling the Laugesen court's fears and by focusing on the Supreme
Court's refinements of the McDonnell Douglas framework, this twofold de-
bate may be satisfactorily resolved in favor of the ADEA's adoption of
title VII analysis.
A. Judicial Interpretation and Statutory Construction
In Laugesen,127 the Sixth Circuit counseled strongly against the auto-
matic application of McDonnell Douglas to ADEA suits. Primarily, the
court reasoned that the McDonnell Douglas allocation shifted the burden
of proof to the defendant in recognition of the wholly arbitrary nature of
racial classifications. 28 Interpreting this burden to be one of persuasion,
the Sixth Circuit characterized McDonnell Douglas as a strict, formalistic
approach. 29 Despite the identical prohibitions of title VII and the ADEA,
the court maintained that congressional approval of a less strict approach
was embodied in Congress' separation of the two statutory schemes.' 30
This argument against extending title VII analysis to age discrimination
claims is a misjudgment of congressional intent and judicial precedent. As
the Supreme Court noted in Lorrilard v. Pons, 3 ' the ADEA is a hybrid
statute incorporating the enforcement provisions of the FLSA and the sub-
stantive prohibitions of title VII. 13' The hybrid design of the ADEA, the
Court stated, is a reflection of congressional "dissatisfaction with some ele-
125. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 1981); Rod-
riguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Mar-
shall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977); Bishop v. Jelleff
Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 593-94 (D.D.C. 1974).
127. 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1045 (1975).
128. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 105.
130. 510 F.2d at 312-13 n.4.
131. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
132. Id at 578.
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ments of each of the preexisting schemes." 133 By selectively incorporating
the efficacious sections of each "scheme," Congress corrected title VII's
deficiencies and simultaneously maintained consistency in fair employ-
ment legislation.
The Pons Court deemed that Congress, in enacting the ADEA, im-
pliedly condoned the extension of judicial interpretation accorded title VII
and the FLSA.' 34 In determining whether Congress afforded the right to a
jury trial under the ADEA, the Court resorted to a comparative analysis of
the ADEA provision at issue to the model scheme. Justice Marshall, writ-
ing for a unanimous Court, preliminarily noted that under current judicial
interpretation there is a right to a jury trial in actions under the FLSA.' 35
He found "a significant indication of Congress' intent" to afford the same
right under the ADEA because of the similarity in the procedural provi-
sions of the two statutes. 136 The Court justified its interpretation of con-
gressional intent by stating that "where, as here, Congress adopts a new
law incorporating sections of prior law, Congress normally can be pre-
sumed to have had knowledge of the interpretations given to the incorpo-
rated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute."'
' 37
Laugesen ignored the message of Congress by deemphasizing the simi-
larity between title VII and the ADEA's substantive prohibitions. 138 Con-
trary to the Sixth Circuit's conclusion, Congress impliedly approved of the
McDonnell Douglas allocation of burdens by similarly structuring the
prohibitions of title VII and the ADEA. The judicial construction and
implementation of title VII's substantive prohibitions in McDonnell Doug-
las should be extended to the ADEA under the Pons analysis. The fact
that McDonnell Douglas post dated the ADEA's enactment does not de-
tract from this conclusion. Holding Congress to post-enactment judicial
133. Id. The Supreme Court discussed the three major areas of dissatisfaction. Congress
rejected the judicial interpretaton of the FLSA restricting injunctive relief to suits brought
by the Secretary of Labor by providing under § 626(b) of the ADEA that injunctive relief
was available in any action, including private suits. Id at 581. Congress also rejected the
FLSA's criminal penalties provision. Id. at 581-82. Finally, Congress rejected title VIl's
liquidated damages penalty by incorporating the FLSA's provision that requires proof of
willful violations as a precondition to the penalty. Id. at 581.
Moreover, to avoid overburdening the EEOC, Congress placed administration of the
ADEA in the hands of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor which also
administers the FLSA. Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of
1978: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 85, 91-92 (1979).
134. Pons, 434 U.S. at 580-81.
135. Id. at 580.
136. Id
137. Id. at 581.
138. Laugesen, 510 F.2d at 311. See also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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interpretation is still consistent with Justice Marshall's reasoning that
when Congress has exhibited a detailed knowledge of the judicial interpre-
tation accorded the model scheme, then the presumption of congressional
approval is appropriate. 39 Congress exhibited that knowledge in the ex-
tensive revisions it made to the ADEA in the 1978 amendments following
the McDonnell Douglas decision. 4o
The Sixth Circuit is also incorrect for characterizing McDonnell Douglas
as a strict, formalistic approach properly confined to discrimination claims
involving "the immutable characteristics of color, sex, and national ori-
gin.""'4 This interpretation of McDonnell Douglas was based on the erro-
neous assumption that McDonnell Douglas shifted the burden of
persuasion to the defendant. 42 Laugesen apparently concluded that given
the nonarbitrary nature of some age classifications the burden of persua-
sion should remain with the plaintiff even though a prima facie case of
discrimination could be made under McDonnell Douglas' specification. ' 43
The refinement made by the Supreme Court subsequent to McDonnell
Douglas eliminates this concern. Justice Powell explained in Burdine that
the burden of production in McDonnell Douglas shifted only when the em-
ployer was required "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the employee's rejection.""' He cautioned that "[tihe ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally dis-
criminated remains at all times with the plaintiff."' 145
McDonnell Douglas "is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate evi-
dence in light of common experience" 4' and not a strict approach to in-
vidious discrimination. The Court in McDonnell Douglas simply resorted
to the common law device of evidentiary presumptions for traditionally
recognized purposes.147 By dividing the burden of production between the
plaintiff and the defendant the Court was recognizing the plaintiff's infe-
rior access to evidence of motive, 41 the probability that the acts com-
plained of, "if otherwise unexplained, are . . . based on the consideration
139. Pons, 434 U.S. at 581.
140. See supra note 7. When the 1978 amendments were enacted, Congress was aware
that the Supreme Court would presume congressional approval of prior judicial interpreta-
tion unless affirmative legislative action was taken. The 1978 amendment that extended the
right to a jury trial in ADEA cases was in direct response to Ponrs. Pons, 434 U.S. at 581.
141. Laugensen, 510 F.2d at 312-13 n.4. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
142. Laugesen, 510 F.2d at 313.
143. Id See also supra note 105.
144. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56. See also supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
145. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
146. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
147. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
148. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
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of impermissible factors,"' 49 and the important social policy behind equal
employment legislation.'5"
Arguably the Supreme Court has itself impugned the use of McDonnell
Douglas in ADEA disparate treatment cases. In the Burdine refinements
to McDonnell Douglas, the Court cited with approval' 52 the First Cir-
cuit's decision in Loeb v. Textron, Inc. 153 The Loeb court had earlier con-
cluded that, because of the statutory similarity of the ADEA and title VII,
the McDonnell Douglas framework was also appropriate in ADEA litiga-
tion. '54 Justice Powell in Burdine cited Loeb as correctly holding that the
defendant bears merely the burden of production under the Supreme
Court's title VII precedents.' 55 On its discussion regarding the defendant's
ability to meet this burden under McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court
twice referred to the Loeb decision.' 56 These three citations to Loeb sug-
gest that the Supreme Court approved the ultimate conclusion reached by
the First Circuit.
B. Dividing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury
The Sixth Circuit criticized McDonnell Douglas because it did not deal
with the complications associated with a jury proceeding.' 57 The
Laugesen court argued that McDonnell Douglas' burden allocation was in-
appropriate for age discrimination cases because it would confuse the
jury.5 " Apparently, the Sixth Circuit assumed that the McDonnell Doug-
las standards would be included verbatim in the jury instructions leaving
149. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
150. McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976). Two
white employees alleged their employment discharge was racially discriminatory under title
VII. The Court held that the McDonnell Douglas guidelines equally applied to allegations
of race discrimination brought by whites since title VII prohibits "[discriminatory prefer-
ence of any [racial] group, minority or majority." Id. at 279 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
15 1. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
152. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 n.4, 258-59.
153. 600 F.2d 1003 (Ist Cir. 1979).
154. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1010.
155. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 n.4 (citation to Loeb comparing it to other circuit decisions
interpreting the nature of the defendant's burden under McDonnell Douglas).
156. Id. at 258, 259. The Supreme Court agreed with Loeb that "the defendant's expla-
nation of its reasons must be clear and reasonably specific." 1d. at 258 (citing Loeb, 600
F.2d at 1011-12 & n.5). The Court also agreed that the reasonableness of the employer's
judgment is not properly a part of his production burden. Id. at 259 (citing Loeb, 600 F.2d
at 1012 n.6).
157. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
158. Laugesen, 510 F.2d at 312.
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laymen to monitor the shift in evidentiary burdens. 5 9
The First Circuit, however, found little difficulty in adapting the Mc-
Donnell Douglas principles to age discrimination despite the jury trial fea-
ture of ADEA proceedings. In Loeb,16° the court stated that "McDonnell
Douglas was not written as a prospective jury charge."'16 Indirectly re-
sponding to the Sixth Circuit's concern, Loeb held that "only the factual
determinations necessary to the underlying rationale of McDonnell Doug-
las need be made by the jury-the burden shifting can and should be
monitored by the judge."'' 62 Any instruction to the jury on the factual
issues identified by McDonnell Douglas could be translated into lay terms
by the judge.
The First Circuit's response in Loeb was based on common sense and
hindsight. The hindsight emanated from the Supreme Court decision in
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney. 163 In Sweeney, the
Supreme Court corrected the First Circuit's prior interpretation of McDon-
nell Douglas and stressed careful attention to McDonnell Douglas' concep-
tual underpinnings.' 64 With that lesson in mind, the First Circuit
concluded that "McDonnell Douglas to a large extend is an analytical
framework . . . to give judges a method of organizing evidence and as-
signing burdens of production and persuasion in a discrimination case."' 6 5
C Policy Considerations
There are no countervailing policy concerns that would prevent the ex-
tension of McDonnell Douglas to ADEA disparate treatment cases. The
overriding aim of both title VII and the ADEA is "the elimination of dis-
crimination from the workplace."' 66 Congressional intolerance of covert
employment discrimination is equally manifested in the ADEA as borne
out by the structural similarity of the two statutes.' 67
Nevertheless, there may be some concern that title VII analysis in
ADEA suits will congest the federal court docket because McDonnell
Douglas' allocation of evidentiary burdens reduces the risk of directed ver-
dicts while ensuring full inquiry into circumstantial discrimination
159. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
160. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
161. Id. at 1016.
162. Id.
163. 439 U.S. 24 (1978). See also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
164. 439 U.S. 24 (1978). The First Circuit had incorrectly interpreted McDonnell Doug-
las as imposing a burden of persuasion on the defendant.
165. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1016.




claims. 6 ' Typically, in a civil suit the plaintiff alone carries the burden of
production. This requires the plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence on
each element of the claim to avoid an adverse directed verdict. 6 9 Under
McDonnell Douglas, however, the plaintiff is temporarily relieved of the
burden of production regarding discriminatory intent. 170 By establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff is shielded from judgment
until after he has concluded his pretext argument.' 7' Congress, though,
foresaw the threat of increased litigation and attempted to alleviate the
problem by requiring the parties to submit to administrative conciliation
and conference prior to trial.'17 Although this is only a partial solution, it
does have the intended effect of weeding out meritless discrimination
claims.
Commentators have voiced an additional concern that employers will
essentially be forced to accommodate the aged in order to prevent intru-
sion by the courts into legitimate business decisions. 173 This fear is unwar-
ranted for two reasons. First, the ADEA, like title VII, only encourages
employers to make employment decisions on a more individualized basis.
As the Supreme Court noted,
Congress did not intend by [title VII] to guarantee a job to every
person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not
command that any person be hired simply because he was for-
merly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of
a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, ...
is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is re-
quired by Congress is the removal of artifical, arbitrary, and un-
necessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other imper-
missible classification.174 The ADEA expressly embodies this no-
tion by extracting the phrase "any action . . . where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age"
from the statutory prohibitions. 75
Second, as long as impermissible factors are not the basis of employ-
ment decisions, employers may freely go about business management.
168. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56. See also Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630
F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980).
169. See supra note 9.
170. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
171. Id. at 256.
172. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
173. See Note, The Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380,
395-97 (1976).
174. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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The court's judgment is not to be substituted in the place of management's
until a conclusive finding of discrimination is made. 17 6
IV. MODIFYING THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PRIMA FACIE CASE TO
SUIT ADEA DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIMS
The majority of federal courts have concluded that a modified version of
the McDonnell Douglas framework is appropriate in ADEA disparate
treatment cases.' 77 These courts deem the Sixth Circuit's concern over the
differences between age and title VII's classifications 78 as more properly a
matter of adapting McDonnell Douglas' prima facie proof to suit ADEA
cases.179 They note that the Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas, ex-
pressly authorized the modification of the prima facie elements to accom-
modate "differing factual situations."' 8 °
The courts, however, disagree over the modification that is necessary to
transfer the McDonnell Douglas inference of discriminatory intent to age
discrimination claims.' Of the four elements of prima facie proof speci-
fied in McDonnell Douglas, only the first two standing requirements, mem-
bership in the statutory protected class and employment rejection, 8 2 have
been uniformly borrowed by the courts in formulating a prima facie case
under the ADEA. 83 The latter two proof requirements, employment
competency and continued search for similarly qualified persons,'84 have
been the subject of considerable debate.8 5
A. Differences Between Age and Race
The controversy is not surprising since the federal courts had little gui-
dance, prior to the Burdine refinements, in devising an analogous McDon-
nell Douglas prima facie case. 186 Once the Supreme Court clarified the
176. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578 ("courts may not impose [a judicially divised hiring scheme]
on an employer at least until a violation of title VII has been proved . ). See also supra
notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 17.
178. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1981); Moses v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 550 F.2d 1113-14 (8th Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F.
Supp. 715, 723 (D.C.N.Y. 1978).
181. See supra note 19.
182. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
183. See supra notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
184. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
185. See, e.g., Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (Ist Cir. 1979).
186. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
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proof necessary in terms of "circumstances which give rise to an inference
of unlawful discrimination" 87 by "eliminat[ing] the most common nondis-
criminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection,"'88 the courts focused on
the nature of age discrimination, and compared it to racial discrimina-
tion.'8 9 The compromises in the prima facie proof by the different courts
reflect, to a large degree, the extent to which they have compensated for
the differences between age and race.' 90
In discriminatory discharge suits, the Sixth Circuit strongly counseled
the examiner to pay critical attention to the fact that "[t]he progression of
age is a universal human process.'"' The court explained that the re-
placement of older workers by younger ones is an inherent consequence of
the aging process and should not be interpreted in the ordinary case, as it
would be under McDonnell Douglas, as an act of discrimination.' 92 The
Fifth Circuit heeded this caution by noting that
[b]ecause the aging process causes employees constantly to exit
the workforce while younger ones enter, simply the replacement
of an older employee by a younger worker does not raise the
same inference of improper motive that attends the replacement
of a black by a white person in a Title VII case. 19 3
The court concluded that proof of replacement by a younger person
outside the protected group was necessary to strengthen the inference of
discrimination in an ADEA case.' 94
Indeed, the courts are correct in reasoning that the progression and re-
placement of older workers does not alone create an inference of discrimi-
natory discharge. They are incorrect, however, in concluding that
McDonnell Douglas' prima facie proof must be strengthened in ADEA
cases. The distinction noted by the courts is simply that age is related to an
employee's retirement decision. McDonnell Douglas, though, requires as
an element of the prima facie case that the plaintiff was subject to an ad-
verse employment decision."' In discharge situations, the plaintiff must
show that he was involuntarily terminated. When an older worker, or for
that matter, a black employee, voluntarily terminates his employment, he
187. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
188. Id. at 253-54.
189. See, e.g., Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977).
190. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
191. Laugesen, 510 F.2d at 312-13 n.4.
192. Id.
193. Goodyear, 554 F.2d at 736.
194. Id.
195. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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lacks the requisite standing embodied in the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case to claim discriminatory discharge.
Other courts have focused on the distinction of age as a valid indicator
of ability to justify modification of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case. In Cunningham v. Central Beverage, Inc. ,196 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas stated that "the aged unlike,
say those who have been discriminated on the basis of race. . . [have not]
been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped character-
istics not truly indicative of their abilities."' 97 On a generalized basis there
is a rational relationship between age and ability. This distinction from
race, though, does not warrant modification of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case. In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff was required to
show that he "was qualified for the job" to sustain his prima facie case of
disparate hiring.'98 Furnco explained that the presumption of discrimina-
tion was dependent upon proof of ability since the lack of job qualifica-
tions is a legitimate reason for employment rejection."' Similarly, in
disparate discharge suits, satisfactory work performance would be an es-
sential element of the prima facie case. The peculiarity of age as an indi-
cator of ability is sufficiently accommodated by McDonnell Douglas.
B. Circumstances Which Give Rise to an Inference of Unlawful
Discrimination
In specifying the "circumstances which give rise to an inference of un-
lawful discrimination" 2°° in ADEA cases, the courts have imposed proof
requirements in excess of McDonnell Douglas. For disparate discharge
claims, the courts have generally required proof of replacement by some-
one substantially younger or outside the protected class with equal or in-
ferior qualifications. 2° ' The plaintiff in an ADEA disparate hiring or
promotion suit has been similarly required to produce evidence that a per-
son either younger or under forty, who was equally or less qualified, was
employed instead.2 °2 This "replacement" proof is a gloss on the McDon-
nell Douglas factor that "the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of the complainant's
196. 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1080 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 1980).
197. Id. at 1082.
198. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
199. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578.
200. Id
201. See supra notes 106-26 and accompanying text.




McDonnell Douglas imposed this last factor to ensure that there was a
job vacancy and to eliminate any notion that the employer sought a more
capable person for the job.2" In discussing job vacancy, the Supreme
Court did not require proof that the position was filled. The Court merely
required that the employer had continued to seek applicants after the
plaintiff's rejection. The distinction is important because it recognizes that
an employer eventually may decide for economic reasons not to hire at all
and yet may have discriminated during the time the job opening existed.
In addition, requiring proof of "replacement" would also allow the sophis-
ticated employer, who rejected applicants on an impermissible basis, to
skirt liability by temporarily withdrawing the job listing.
In discriminatory discharge cases, both the McDonnell Douglas factor
and the ADEA "replacement" requirement are inappropriate. It is quite
common for an employer to reduce his workforce without seeking or re-
taining a replacement for the discharged employees. The employer, how-
ever, may decide which employees to terminate on the basis of prohibited
considerations such as age or race.
Where proof of "replacement" is available, however, it is relevant in
supporting or diminishing the plaintiffs prima facie case of disparate treat-
ment. For example, if a black applicant is rejected in favor of a white
applicant, the claim of racial discrimination is strengthened. Similarly, if
another black applicant is chosen for the job the inference of racial dis-
crimination is lacking. In age discrimination cases, though, the replace-
ment of a discharged employee or job applicant by one within the
protected age group20 5 should not automatically foreclose a prima facie
case. The most obvious example is the sixty-nine-year old employee re-
placed, despite his satisfactory work performance, by an individual of age
forty. Given the broad age range encompassed by the ADEA and the pro-
gressive nature of aging, the employer may be impermissibly differentiat-
ing between age brackets within the protected group itself. The EEOC
interpretations of the ADEA confirm that the preference of one protected
class member over another would be equally unlawful. 2" As the interpre-
tive regulation explains "if two people apply for the same position, and
one is forty-two and the other fifty-two, the employer may not lawfully
turn down either one on the basis of age. .. .
203. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
204. Id. at 803.
205. See supra note 2.
206. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1981).
207. Id
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On the other hand, "replacement" by someone the same age does not
create the inference of age discrimination. Where "replacement" proof is
available, its significance should be judged under a standard of material
difference in age that a reasonable person would conclude that age was a
factor in the employment decision. The standard is phrased in terms of
"different in age" for two reasons. First, the ADEA prohibits not only
preference for "younger" workers outside the protected class, but also pref-
erence towards members within the statutory protected age group, whether
younger or older than the plaintiff.2°8 Secondly, if the standard were to be
stated as a predetermined age disparity, it would create a safety zone con-
trary to the ADEA's prohibitions in which employers could intentionally
differentiate between workers within the age span without challenge unless
there was direct proof of disparate treatment.
V. CONCLUSION
The McDonnell Douglas allocation of evidentiary burdens remedies the
inequity of motivation proof while facilitating the enforcement of title VII.
Given the similarity in substantive prohibitions and Pons' statutory con-
struction of the ADEA, title VII's disparate treatment framework is appro-
priate for ADEA cases. The differences recognized by the courts between
age and the impermissible classifications under title VII do not warrant a
modification of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. The proof speci-
fied in McDonnell Douglas adequately accommodates the peculiarity of
age as both an indicator of ability and a consideration in retirement deci-
sions. However, unlike race discrimination, age discrimination may still
be indicated where employment preference is given to one within the pro-
tected class. Therefore, the controlling standard for "replacement" proof
in ADEA disparate treatment cases should be "materially different in age"
rather than a protected/nonprotected class distinction.
Kathleen Hannon
208. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
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